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The Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform (hereinafter “the Panel”) was appointed by 
Chairman Ike Skelton and then Ranking Member John McHugh in March 2009 to carry out a 
comprehensive review of the defense acquisition system.  The review was motivated by a 
general sense among the members of the House Armed Services Committee that the Department 
of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition system was not responsive enough to today’s mission needs, not 
rigorous enough in protecting taxpayers, and not disciplined enough in the acquisition of 
weapons systems for tomorrow’s wars.  The breadth of the problems that had recently come to 
light led members to conclude that a systemic examination was appropriate.  The Panel took a 
year to perform its review, holding 14 hearings and 2 briefings covering a broad range of issues 
in defense acquisition.  The Panel approved its interim report on March 4, 2010.  The Panel 
received the Department’s1 views on March 11, 2010 and received additional input from the 
various stakeholder communities on the interim report prior to approving this final report on its 
findings and recommendations. The Panel’s recommendations will now be provided to the full 
House Armed Services Committee. 
 
The Panel found that while the nature of defense acquisition has substantially changed, 
the defense acquisition system has not kept pace.  The system remains structured primarily for 
the acquisition of weapon systems at a time when services represent a much larger share of the 
Department’s acquisitions.  As a result, the Department’s formal acquisition policy has limited 
application to the majority of the Department’s acquisitions.  Furthermore, while the Department 
is currently working to modernize in the “information age,” the acquisition system is particularly 
poorly designed for the acquisition of information technology.  Even in the acquisition of 
weapon systems, the Department’s historical strength, the system continues to generate 
development timeframes for major systems measured in decades, an approach which has resulted 
in unacceptable cost growth, negative effects on industry, and in too many cases, a failure to 
timely meet warfighter needs. 
 
In examining the defense acquisition system, the Panel found little commonality across 
the system.  The acquisition of weapon systems, the acquisition of commercial goods and 
commodities, the acquisition of services and the acquisition of information technology have 
diverse features and challenges.  A few areas, however, did develop as common issues across the 
system, and it is on these that the Panel focuses most of its recommendations.  The Panel found 
that across all categories of acquisition significant improvements can be made in: managing the 
acquisition system; improving the requirements process; developing and incentivizing the 
highest quality acquisition workforce; reforming financial management; and getting the best 
from the industrial base. 
 
                                                            
1 Throughout the Panel’s Report, “the Department” refers to the Department of Defense. 
The Panel began with the question of how well the defense acquisition system is doing in 
delivering value to the warfighter and the taxpayer.  For the most part, the Panel found that there 
is currently no objective way to answer this question.  For most categories of acquisition, only 
anecdotal information exists about instances where the system either performed well, or poorly.  
Even where real performance metrics currently exist, they do not fully address the question.  The 
Panel strongly believes that the defense acquisition system should have a performance 
management structure in place that allows the Department’s senior leaders to identify and correct 
problems in the system, and reinforce and reward success. 
 
The Panel’s approach is to expand the mandate of the Office of Performance Assessment 
and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) to serve as a performance assessment function for the 
acquisition system.  PARCA would track organizations throughout the defense acquisition 
system in meeting pre-negotiated goals for acquisition performance.  Organizations would see 
real consequences for both success and failure in meeting their goals.  The intent of the 
performance metrics and performance management recommendations in this report is not to 
create new layers of bureaucracy.  If the performance management measures envisioned in the 
Panel’s recommendations are implemented properly, program managers could be freed from 
certain reporting responsibilities specific to their individual program.  The Department’s leaders 
should be focused on identifying and addressing the acquisition systems strengths and 
weaknesses, not on second guessing the programmatic decisions made by those in the field. 
 
In addition to instituting performance management for the acquisition system, the Panel 
recommends a performance management approach for the requirements process upon which the 
acquisition process depends.  The Panel found that challenges with the requirements process are 
a major factor in poor acquisition outcomes.  Most concerning was the fact that the requirements 
process for the acquisition of services, the largest category of acquisition, is almost entirely ad 
hoc.  The process for developing requirements for the acquisition of weapon systems is overly 
cumbersome, but also lacking in the expertise and capacity required to truly vet joint military 
requirements.  A major effort is required to address these flaws. 
 
The Panel believes that the Department should establish the acquisition workforce as a 
model within the Department for more flexible personnel management that rewards success and 
includes accountability.  The Department’s Acquisition Workforce Demonstration Program and 
the authorities in section 1113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
provide a solid foundation for creating an acquisition workforce that will obtain the value the 
Department needs.  To achieve this, the Department requires flexibility to efficiently hire 
qualified new employees, and to manage its workforce in a manner that promotes superior 
performance.  Using these tools the Department can develop new regulations for the civilian 
workforce which include fair, credible, and transparent methods for hiring and assigning 
personnel, and for appraising and incentivizing employee performance. 
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Underlying the success of the defense acquisition system is the Department’s financial 
management system.  The Panel is concerned that the inability to provide accurate and timely 
financial information prevents the Department from adequately managing its acquisition 
programs and from implementing true acquisition reform. The implications of poor financial 
management stretch beyond the Department of Defense.  Indeed, given that the Department is 
the largest agency in the federal government, owning 86 percent of the government's assets 
(estimated at $4.6 trillion), it is essential that the Department maintain strong financial 
management and business systems that allow for comprehensive auditing, in order to improve 
financial management government-wide and to achieve an unqualified audit opinion not only on 
the Department’s financial statements, but also on the U.S. Government’s consolidated financial 
statements.   
 
The Panel also focused on how to get the most out of the industrial base.  The 
Department has long worked to protect those elements of the defense industrial base that are 
perishable and unique to the Department.  The Panel supports this priority.  However, the Panel 
believes that the Department can enhance competition and gain access to more innovative 
technology, by developing measures to utilize more of the industrial base, especially small and 
mid-tier businesses.  The Panel also believes that the Department is best served when it deals 
with responsible contractors.  Contracting officers need access to accurate information on 
contractors that are known to be in violation of the law in making the determination about 
whether a contractor is responsible. 
 
Two topics which could have sustained their own year-long investigation were addressed 
in the Panel’s work.  Wartime contracting has been a thread in the Panel’s work, but not its main 
focus.  The Panel believes that the excellent work and insightful findings of the Gansler 
Commission, when fully implemented, will address many of the underlying problems in this 
area.  The Panel also notes that Congress created the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
specifically to investigate this question.  Rapid acquisition is also clearly a significant challenge 
for the Department.  The current system for satisfying Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) 
works best when it is being directly tasked by the Secretary of Defense, as has been the case with 
mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and certain intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) programs.  The Secretary cannot personally intervene on all JUONs, 
however, and the current system isn’t always as fast as it could be when senior leaders do not 
intervene.  The Panel notes that Congress commissioned a study by the Defense Science Board 
of how the Department fulfills JUONS.  That study recommended the creation of a new Rapid 
Acquisition Fielding Agency.  The Panel believes, however, that improving the responsiveness 
of the core acquisition system, before creating a new organization for rapid acquisition, will help 
clarify what the true mission for such an organization might be. 
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This report begins with a description of the defense acquisition system as the Panel 
observed it during its review.  The report then moves to a discussion of how a performance 
management approach for defense acquisition and for requirements could be structured to allow 
senior leaders to identify and correct problems in those systems and make them more responsive 
to warfighter needs.  The report then focuses on how to ensure a highly motivated and highly 
skilled acquisition workforce for the Department.  It describes the challenges for acquisition 
generated by the Department’s inability to manage it financial information, and it discusses ways 
to expand and protect the quality of the industrial base. 
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PART I:  THE STRUCTURE OF WHAT WE ARE BUYING  
AND THE CHALLENGES IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
Subpart A: The Major Categories of Acquisition and Their Challenges 
  
Although the Department’s policy and the Panel’s own work plan2 refer to a “defense 
acquisition system” there is in fact very little of the unity in the system that such a term implies.  
This finding is true on at least two levels.  First, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) exercises direct oversight over a relatively small 
percentage of acquisitions: mostly major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs), and recently, 
very large service contracts (those over $1 billion).3  Likewise, the bulk of overarching DOD 
policy and congressional oversight focus applies to this portion of the defense acquisition 
system.4  The bulk of the system is largely outside the day to day purview of USD AT&L and 
many of the most well known acquisition statutes (e.g. Nunn-McCurdy) don’t apply to the entire 
acquisition system.  A much greater share of the defense acquisition system is run entirely by the 
military departments and is not centrally managed.  Second, the character of the defense 
acquisition system varies greatly depending on the nature of the item being acquired.  In fact, the 
Panel found that acquisition at the Department is funded, managed, overseen, and operated 
according to notably different processes depending on whether the category of item being 
acquired is a weapon system (military-unique good); a commercial good or commodity; a 
military-unique or commercial service; or information technology.  The report will analyze these 
categories individually before discussing its conclusions about the system as a whole. 
 
Acquisition of Weapon Systems (Military Unique Goods) 
 
The warfighting mission of the Department of Defense is unique, and as a natural 
consequence, it is necessary and appropriate, at some level, that the Department acquires 
significant quantities of military-unique goods to help fulfill its warfighting requirements.  The 
category of military-unique goods is largely synonymous with the term “weapon systems”5  For 
a variety of reasons historical and cultural the acquisition of weapon systems has been the 
marquee focus of defense acquisition.  Similarly, the Department’s acquisition culture, process, 
and policy have been shaped by the characteristics of this category. 
                                                            
2 See Appendix A for the Panel’s work plan and Appendix B for a list of the Panel’s events 
3 The Defense Logistics Agency also reports to the USD AT&L but typically few if any issues relating to DLA get 
elevated to the USD AT&L’s attention. 
4 Information provided to the Panel by the Department indicates that MDAPS constitute just under 20% of 
acquisition spending.  Large service contracts reviewed by USD AT&L constitute approximately another 11%.  
5 While the Panel notes that the category of military-unique goods is not literally synonymous with weapon systems, 
it is the Panel’s belief that the acquisition of military-unique goods not needed in direct support of warfighting 
missions should be sharply limited.  The term “weapon system” is not defined in statute or regulation but is defined 
in the Defense Acquisition University’s Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms as an item that can 
be used directly by the Armed Forces to carry out combat missions. 
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The Panel believes that the Department’s performance on weapon systems acquisition 
taken as a whole has been unacceptable.  Last year, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reported that on the then 96 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) the 
Department had experienced $296 billion in total cost growth and an average of 22 months 
schedule delay6.  The Panel notes that as the U.S. Armed Forces remain the world’s best 
equipped fighting force, it would be incorrect to conclude that the defense acquisition system is 
failing.  However, the Panel believes that system for acquiring weapon systems is falling far 
short of delivering full value to the warfighter and to American taxpayers.  These findings led 
Congress to enact the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), and the 
Panel strongly supports the reforms in that Act. 
 
WSARA is still in the process of being implemented7 and the Panel does not recommend 
making fundamental changes to that Act.  However, the Panel’s examination did identify 
additional issues in weapon systems acquisition that were not fully addressed in the Act.  
Furthermore, the Panel finds that the weapon systems acquisition culture negatively influences 
other parts of the acquisition system through both its impact on the Department’s acquisition 
policy and its impact on the defense industry. 
 
It is notable that relevant and useful performance metrics, while not perfect, nonetheless 
exist in weapon systems acquisition.  Such performance metrics are almost entirely lacking in 
every other area of defense acquisition. Furthermore, even with weapon systems acquisition, a 
critical metric that is not directly addressed is a measure of whether the weapon systems 
acquisition process is delivering capability to warfighters when they actually need it.  Put simply, 
the Panel believes that there is a mismatch between the culture of weapon systems acquisition 
and the demands that current operational requirements put on the acquisition system.  Even in the 
Department’s ninth year of active warfare during which large quantities of equipment have been 
consumed and numerous new mission needs have been generated, weapon systems acquisition 
remains typified by programs with development timelines lasting more than a decade. 
                                                            
6 MDAPs are an imprecise but effective measure of performance in weapon systems acquisition.  The list of MDAPs 
has been revised since GAO’s last report and now contains 102 entries.  However, the current list is overwhelmingly 
composed of weapon systems.  The exceptions, i.e. non-weapon system MDAPs, as determined by the Panel, were 
Cobra Judy Replacement, National Airspace System, NPOESS (Department of Commerce lead), GCSS-Army, 
DIMHRS (terminated in the FY11 budget), JPATS, 2 programs for the demilitarization of chemical weapons, and 
the Global Broadcast System.  This means that of the 102 currently designated MDAPS (as of July 2009), 9 appear 
to serve functions that are not primarily related to combat. 
7 DOD has taken a number of steps to implement the requirements of WSARA.  Christine Fox was sworn in as the 
CAPE on November 3, 2009.  The Secretary of Defense appointed a Director of Systems Engineering and an Acting 
Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation.  The Secretary created a new Office of Performance Assessment 
and Root Cause Analysis, and appointed a Director of the Office.  In November 2009, USD AT&L issued a Weapon 
System Acquisition Reform Product Support Assessment Report.  On December 4, 2009, USD AT&L published a 
Directive Type Memorandum on WSARA Implementation modifying DOD acquisition guidance to align with the 
Act, and published a proposed rule implementing the Act’s requirements relating to contractor organizational 
conflicts of interest in February 2010.  
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Weapon systems acquisition has historically tended to focus on incorporating cutting-
edge technology into such capital-intensive items as high performance aircraft, naval ships, and 
armored vehicles.  These two primary areas of focus – the push for cutting-edge technology and 
the development and renewal of capital intensive systems – have resulted in one definitive 
outcome: weapon systems acquisition is typified by exceptionally long development cycles.8  
The pressure to develop cutting edge technologies requires extended technology development 
and integration.  Potential user communities recognize that the capital intensive nature of 
individual systems means that “missing the boat” by not getting a desired requirement included 
on a system means losing the opportunity to fulfill that requirement for an extended period of 
time.  These two dynamics form a feedback loop where the pressure to enhance requirements 
extends development cycles and consumes resources which increases the competition for 
resources which increases the pressure to include additional requirements on systems in line to 
receive those scarce resources. 
 
The consequences of this feedback loop are clearly illustrated by the Department’s 
experience with the F-22.  The F-22 program may be reasonably judged to have begun in 1986 
with the award of two demonstration/validation contracts to Lockheed and Northrop.9 The F-22 
entered production in 2001, a span of 15 years in development.  F-22 production began in 2001, 
and will be completed in 2012, for a production cycle of 12 years.  While the F-22 presents an 
extreme example even by DOD standards, it is notable that this relationship between 
development and production cycles is not only the inverse of those that typify commercial 
cycles, but also the inverse of DOD’s current policy expressing a preference for evolutionary 
acquisition which advocates moving programs rapidly into production using mature technology 
and open systems architectures and then “spiraling in” technology and performance 
improvements during an extended production cycle.10 
 
The culture of weapons systems acquisition is reinforced by similar cultures in the two 
other departmental processes which drive acquisition outcomes:  the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) which generates the requirements for weapons 
                                                            
8 In this instance, development cycles for similarly complex commercial systems (i.e. ships, aircraft, vehicles) are 
used as a point of comparison to support the Panel’s assertion that DOD development cycles are long.  Even with the 
two year delay in the development of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, current projections are that the aircraft will enter 
airline service 8 years after the Boeing board approved development of a 7E7 aircraft.  The F-22 achieved IOC in 
2005, 20 years after the award of the demonstration/validation contracts. 
9 At that time, the program was known as the Advanced Tactical Fighter Program.  The F-22 was Lockheed’s 
winning design for the program. 
10 DODI 5000.02 defines Evolutionary Acquisition this way: “An evolutionary approach delivers capability in 
increments, recognizing, up front, the need for future capability improvements. The objective is to balance needs 
and available capability with resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user quickly. The success of the 
strategy depends on phased definition of capability needs and system requirements, and the maturation of 
technologies that lead to disciplined development and production of systems that provide increasing capability over 
time.” 
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systems, and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) which provides the 
budget for the acquisition of weapon systems.  The Panel received compelling testimony that the 
complexity inherent in coordinating these robust and largely independent bureaucratic processes 
with an acquisition program over a period of multiple decades is one of the primary challenges in 
defense acquisition.11  JCIDS, as noted above, often results in the inclusion of more and more 
complex technological requirements that lead to extended acquisition development timelines.   
The Panel also received testimony that the joint staff lacks some of the analytical expertise 
necessary to ensure that the JCIDS process rigorously vets proposed requirements. 
 
The PPBS is organized around the five-year Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 
which is revised every other year.  This structure also tends to lengthen acquisition timelines.  
Weapon systems are largely acquired using appropriations that have existed for decades that are 
solely dedicated to this purpose and are programmed ahead in detail for at least five years.  The 
limited flexibility in the POM process means that when a mission need is identified, it is often a 
two-year wait until a budget wedge for that purpose can be inserted in the next POM and funding 
is often limited in the first few years after it is obtained.   The Panel notes that the early stages of 
an acquisition program are in many ways the most critical.  It is in the early stages that 
investments must be made in systems engineering, in acquiring technical data rights to support 
competition and system sustainment, and in robust developmental testing.  While all these 
elements are critical for overall program success and best accomplished early, they are all too 
easy to defer when funding is limited.  The slow reaction time of PPBS to new mission needs 
further incentivizes those in the requirements and acquisition processes to plan for extended 
program timelines.  Instability in the budget process also frequently extends program timelines 
by requiring program managers to delay program scope due to unexpected funding limitations.  
The POM process is also highly focused on discrete programs of record which makes it difficult 
to obtain funding for integrating capabilities needed across multiple programs of record. 
 
The limitations of the requirements and budget processes may be best illustrated by the 
fact that urgent operational needs are routed entirely outside the JCIDs and PPBS processes.  The 
Panel notes that the Defense Science Board in its June 2009 study argued that the requirements, 
acquisition, and budget processes were so insurmountably tied to the existing acquisition culture 
and its extended timelines, that a Rapid Acquisition Fielding Agency should be created to meet 
urgent operational needs.12  The Panel believes that for the most urgent operational needs, 
special acquisition processes are clearly warranted.  At the same time, the Panel believes the 
Department and the Congress should not accept program development timelines routinely 
measured in double digits for most of the Department’s needs as this approach will not be 
responsive to the Department’s operational requirements.  The Panel believes that the 
                                                            
11 Testimony of The Honorable Gordon England, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, USN (ret.), and Lieutenant 
General Ron Kadish, USAF (ret.) delivered at the Panel hearing of June 3, 2009 entitled “Coordinating 
Requirements, Budgets, and Acquisition:  How Does It Affect Costs and Acquisition Outcomes?” 
12 Defense Science Board, “Fulfillment of Urgent Operation Needs,” July 2009. 
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Department must begin to actually apply its policies expressing a preference for evolutionary 
acquisition and open systems architecture in ways which result in different acquisition strategies 
and shorter development timeliness.13 
 
The effects of the current approach to weapon systems acquisition on the defense 
industry also are significant.  The length and scope of weapon system programs has accelerated 
defense industry’s consolidation around a handful of aerospace firms that now control large 
amounts of production capacity across the entire span of the defense acquisition system.  Only 
the largest firms have access to the resources and expertise to bid the most complex programs, 
and it is difficult for firms of all but the largest size to survive losing them.  As a result, 
competition is reduced at the front end of programs, and all but eliminated in the sustainment 
phase (often as a result of poor planning for sustainment).  Small businesses are largely locked 
out of the process or accorded contracts only on the goodwill of one of the larger firms.  Mid-tier 
companies are either absorbed or decide to abandon defense acquisition for the more competitive 
commercial sphere, especially after a large weapon system competition loss.  Winning or losing 
individual contracts becomes such a critical matter that the incentives to protest contract awards 
are overwhelming.  The Panel is concerned that the end result of this process is the gradual 
erosion of competition and innovation in the defense industrial base. 
 
Acquisition of Commercial Goods and Commodities 
 
An integral part of defense acquisition is the purchase of commercial goods and 
commodities, and the suppliers of those goods are a significant portion of the industrial base.    
As the Department is able to participate in a vigorous commercial marketplace to acquire these 
goods, this area of the defense acquisition system should deliver excellent value to the 
Department.  This may largely be the case; however, the Department has no metrics for 
evaluating this question, and some anecdotal evidence that exists creates concern that full value 
is often not being obtained.  The Panel notes especially the case of the aircraft refrigerator 
purchased by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) whose price increased from $13,825 in 
March 2002 to $32,642 in September 2004.14  There is currently no system in place through 
which contracting officers routinely check the prices they pay against prices paid in the past for 
identical items. 
 
As the Department’s largest logistics combat support agency, DLA supplies almost every 
consumable item America's military services need to operate, from meals ready to eat to jet fuel.  
DLA also helps dispose of excess or unusable materiel or equipment.  In addition, DLA provides 
                                                            
13 In addition to evolutionary or spiral acquisition, a block development approach can assist in establishing realistic 
requirements and speeding entry into production. 
14 Testimony of Bill Solis, Director, Defense Capabilities Management, Government Accountability Office, entitled 
“Defense Acquisition:  Sound Practices Critical to Ensuring Value for the Defense Logistics Agency’s 
Acquisitions,” delivered to the Panel on September 24, 2009, page 12. 
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supplies to several civilian agencies emergency preparedness and humanitarian missions.  The 
2005 Base Realignment and Closure plan transferred and realigned additional functions from the 
military services to DLA in order to gain defense-wide sourcing efficiencies.  DLA essentially 
assumed responsibility of “retail” inventory levels and requisition processing.  
 
How DLA determines what and how much to buy is based on the defined requirements of 
its military customers.  A consistent theme the Panel heard is that a prerequisite for good 
outcomes is properly defined requirements; this is true whether contracting officers are 
contracting for weapons systems, support services, or commodities.  However, poor 
requirements definition can lead to inefficient management of commodities.  For example, 
inaccurate forecasting has resulted in billions of dollars worth of excess inventories of supplies 
that are simply not needed and are expensive to warehouse and manage.15  At the same time, 
when forecasts do not match actual demand, the Department runs short on critical supplies for 
the military. 
 
The Panel received testimony that the requirements process for commodities and 
commercial goods acquisition can often lead to waste due to the Department’s problems with 
supply chain management.  Supply chain management is critically important to the operational 
capability of U.S. forces.  The effectiveness and efficiency, as well as management, of the supply 
chain have experienced problems which placed it on GAO’s high risk list.  In response, the 
Department developed the DOD Plan for Improvement in the GAO High Risk Area of Supply 
Chain Management with a Focus on Inventory Management and Distribution” (i.e., the Supply 
Chain Management Plan).  The Department subsequently also released its Logistics Roadmap, 
which is intended to be the framework for guiding, measuring and tracking DOD’s logistics 
improvement efforts, as well as determining whether current programs and initiatives are 
sufficient to close any identified capability gaps.16  One focus area was that of asset visibility 
(e.g., where is it? How will it get there and when will it get there?). 
 
The use of inappropriate contracting vehicles also can lead to the inefficient acquisition 
of commodities as was the case at one point with some of DLA’s prime vendor contracts.  In 
2006, GAO reported that problems with DLA’s management of prime vendor contracts for food 
service equipment (e.g. the refrigerator example above) and construction equipment meant that 
DLA was vulnerable to overpaying, in some cases dramatically, for simple commercially 
                                                            
15 Testimony of Bill Solis, Director, Defense Capabilities Management, Government Accountability Office, entitled 
“Defense Acquisition:  Sound Practices Critical to Ensuring Value for the Defense Logistics Agency’s 
Acquisitions,” delivered to the Panel on September 24, 2009, page 7. 
16 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
Department of Defense Logistics Roadmap (July 2008). 
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available items.17  DLA eventually determined that some of its prime vendor contracts were not 
appropriate and it terminated those contracts. 
 
 
Acquisition of Services  
 
While weapon systems remain the marquee focus for defense acquisition, the money is 
actually shifting elsewhere.  Acquisition of services now constitutes a majority of the acquisition 
budget.18  The Department obligates approximately $200 billion for contractor supported 
services, more than double the amount spent on such services a decade ago.  This trend is not 
unique to DOD; federal spending on services represents over 60 percent of total contract 
spending government-wide.   GAO has noted that the increasing use of contractors continues to 
be the result of individual decisions made across the Department, the military services and the 
defense components and is not based on a strategic, comprehensive plan.19   
 
The increase in the Department’s reliance on contractors led the Secretary of Defense to 
announce, in April 2009, his intent to scale back significantly the role of contractors in support 
services by reducing the number of support service contractors from the current level of 39 
percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent, and replace contractor personnel 
with full-time DOD civilian employees.  However, the question for the Department is not 
whether it should acquire services – contractors are clearly part of the force structure mix – but 
the extent and type of services that should be contracted, and the level of oversight for contracted 
services.  Within the U.S. and at U.S. military installations overseas, contractors provide basic 
base support operations (such as food and housing), logistical support, equipment maintenance, 
and administrative support.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors provide not only traditional 
logistical and maintenance support, but also intelligence analysis and interpreters. 
  
The variety of types of services provided – along with the variety of the types of service 
contracts awarded – leads to challenges in describing requirements, establishing measurable and 
performance-based outcomes, and overseeing contractor performance.  One challenge in 
developing effective measures for cost, delivery or schedule performance is that services are 
often one-year efforts, and little insight is generated by some measures of contractor performance 
relating to deliveries and schedules in such a short timeframe.   Despite that, GAO has noted that 
if contract quality assurance surveillance is not conducted, not sufficient, or not well 
                                                            
17 GAO “Defense Management: Attention Is Needed to Improve Oversight of DLA Prime Vendor Program,” GAO-
06-739R , June 19, 2006.   
18 A “service” is defined as any “thing”, “class of procurement”, that is not manufactured or does not require 
manufacturing, i.e. a service is not a tangible product, even though the service itself may produce some tangible 
outcome or output. 
19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Actions Needed to Ensure Value for Service Contracts, Testimony before 
the Defense Acquisition Reform Panel, U.S. House Armed Services Committee, GAO-09-643T (Washington, D.C. 
April 23, 2009) 
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documented, DOD is at risk of being unable to identify and correct poor contractor performance 
in a timely manner.  It also is at risk of paying contractors more than the value of the services 
they performed.20       The Panel finds that based on the data currently available, it is unable to 
establish a truly informed opinion about the current level of performance in the acquisition of 
services. 
 
Congress required a management structure for the procurement of services that is 
comparable to that established for the procurement of products  in section 801 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107), codified in section 2330 of title 
10, United States Code.  This requirement was enhanced and implementation deadlines were 
added in section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-
163).  To implement these provisions, the Air Force established a Program Executive Officer for 
Combat and Mission Support who is responsible for management and oversight of high dollar 
value service contracts for the Air Force.  While each systems command within the Navy 
manages its own service contracts, oversight of all service contracting and development of policy 
guidance is handled by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics 
Management.  The Army Contracting Command develops policy guidance and oversees the 
Army’s service contracts. 
 
While all services categories can be narrowed to two major acquisition components – 
commercial services and non-commercial or developmental services – there are within these 
categories a wide range of contractor provided services.  Furthermore, there is no “one size fits 
all” type of services contract.  The variety of services provided, and the contracts awarded makes 
developing standard metrics to assess value difficult.  However, the Panel notes that progress in 
this area is being made particularly in the Department of the Air Force.  The Panel received 
testimony on an Air Force sponsored RAND study examining performance measures for service 
contracting,21 and a staff field visit observed some of these concepts being implemented at the 
Air Education and Training Command at Lackland Air Force Base. 
 
The Panel notes that the measurement of performance in the acquisition of services, 
though equally critical as in other areas of acquisition, is a qualitatively different matter for 
services contracting. In fact, for services the precise metrics may differ even from one buying 
activity to another.  However, the Panel believes that meaningful metrics in the categories of 
cost, quality, and delivery (i.e. timeliness and completeness) must be developed.  The kinds of 
finite or concrete measures used to track hardware (such as development and production 
schedules and unit cost) may not be valid for services where indicators of contractor performance 
                                                            
20 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on 
Department of Defense Services Contracts, GAO-05-274 (Washington, D.C., March 2005). 
21 Testimony of Laura Baldwin, Director, Resource Management Program, RAND Project Air Force, entitled “Air 
Force Services Procurement: Approaches for Management and Measurement” delivered to the Panel on April 23, 
2009.  
may be better judged by quality of service; responsiveness to the client, and cost control.  The 
Department, in compliance with the FAR, uses the Contractor Performance Assessment Rating 
System (CPARS) to track contractor’s performance on service contracts for use in past 
performance evaluations on new contract actions.  The CPARS ratings demonstrate that metrics 
for services acquisition are within reach.  However, as with most performance metrics currently 
used by the Department, CPARS tracks only the performance of the contractor, not the 
performance of the defense acquisition system. 
 
The Panel believes that service contracts require at least the same level of discipline as 
weapon systems acquisition.  Such discipline is critical for planning, requirements definition, 
market research, price reasonableness determinations, and project management and oversight.   
Ensuring that the workforce has these skills is a necessity.   In addition, best practices and 
lessons learned should be shared across the defense enterprise and better coordination is needed 
so that buying services is done more strategically. The Panel notes that section 802 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires a review of service 
contracting by the Defense Science Board which should provide a basis for further 
improvements in the procurement and oversight of services.  The DSB task force was officially 
stood up in December 2009. 
 
The Panel notes with concern that in contrast to the formal, even rigid, requirements 
process for weapons systems acquisition the requirements process for services contracting is 
almost entirely ad hoc.  In many cases the user community on a services contract is a military 
base commander or operational commander.  However, these users are not accustomed to 
thinking of themselves, or operating, as requirements generators.  They are not staffed or trained 
to perform these responsibilities, and for this reason, requirements for services contracts are 
often poorly written.  As a result, the Department is either unable to obtain what it needs, is 
unable to hold contractors accountable for poor performance, or both.  Although improvements 
have been made, weaknesses in the requirements process tied to the Army’s Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract in Iraq proved exceptionally damaging to the 
Department. The Panel notes that overall the requirements process for the acquisition of services 
is a critical weakness in the Department. 
 
The Panel is also concerned that as the volume of service contracting has grown, services 
contracting training has not kept pace.  The Department is not ensuring that the acquisition 
workforce acquires the skills, training, and experience needed to properly write, award, and 
oversee performance of service contracts, which can pose a different set of challenges than those 
associated with the procurement of goods.  The Panel recognizes that the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) has created the Learning Center of Excellence for Service Acquisition, which 
is intended to provide a dedicated, integrating focus on developing an in-depth body of training 
and learning assets to improve DOD's execution of service requirements.  However, the Panel 
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remains concerned that professional-level training courses for services program managers 
continue to be lacking. 
  
 
Information Technology (IT) – A Hybrid/Special Case 
 
The advent of the Information Revolution has not only changed how we as a nation do 
business, but it has significantly impacted how we provide for the common defense.  Information 
Technology (IT), which includes everything from hardware and software systems to data 
standards to commonly agreed-upon architectural frameworks, has completely permeated the 
national security enterprise.  Information as a key enabler of the defense enterprise was identified 
specifically in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy as a critical capability.  
 
 The Department categorizes its investment in IT into broad portfolios or Mission Areas. 
These Mission Areas (MA) include: Business (BMA); Enterprise Information Environment 
(EIEMA); Defense Intelligence (DIMA) and Warfighting (WMA). The breakdown of investment 
by MA is included in Figure 1.  These investment figures help illustrate the magnitude of the 
investment across the Department, as well as the complexity of managing diverse programs that 
affect all areas of acquisition- from embedded IT systems that run the control systems and 
avionics of weapons platforms; to military-unique applications that support intelligence, logistics 
and command and control; to commodity goods and services that provide basic desktop 




Figure 1: IT Mission Areas 
 
                                                            
22  There are four general “types” of IT acquisitions:  (1) application software development and integration; (2) 
straightforward COTS hardware/software integration; (3) integration of COTS and custom developed capabilities; 
and (4) commercially-provided IT services. 
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As in the business world, the 
Department runs on information. IT 
systems not only underpin the 
management and business practices of 
the Department, but they have become 
as integral to weapon systems as gun 
turrets, turbines or thermal sights. At the 
same time as software and IT are 
becoming more prevalent in weapon 
systems, the complexity of these 
systems is growing exponentially. As 
illustrated by Table 1, the percentage of functionality provided by software has increased ten-
fold over the past 40 years.23  
 
Yet at the same time, studies of both commercial and government IT projects have found 
some disturbing statistics. For example, 
 
• Only 16% of IT projects are completed on time and on budget. 
• 31% are cancelled before completion. 
• The remaining 53% are late and over budget, with the typical cost growth exceeding 
the original budget more than 89%. 
• Of the IT projects that are completed, the final product contains only 61% of the 
originally specified features.24 
 
At the same time, the overall lines of executable code are increasing drastically, further 
exacerbating the challenges of IT development. Figure 2 shows the overall increase in the 
estimate source lines of code for national security systems- more than a twofold increase in ten 
years.25 It is worth noting that more than half of that increase is associated with maintenance and 
upgrades for legacy systems, not for new software development projects. 
                                                            
23 Table 2 reflects functionality as of 2000. Today, the percentage of functionality has increased to 90%. See 
Program Manager’s Guide for Managing Software 
(https://acc.dau.mil/GetAttachment.aspx?id=24374&pname=file&aid=2836&lang=en-US) 
24Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software (Nov 2000), 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA385923.pdf. 
25 Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of 
Information Technology (March 2009), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA498375.pdf, pg. 16. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Functions Performed by Software 




Figure 2: Estimate Source Lines of Code for the National Security Community 
 
 The Panel reviewed a recent study by the National Research Council which indicated a 
number of findings that reflect the reality that DOD’s weapon systems acquisition focused 
process is insufficient to deal with IT acquisition26  As was pointed out in testimony before the 
Panel, the traditional defense acquisition process is “ill-suited for information technology 
systems. Phase A is intended to mature technology; yet information technologies are now largely 
matured in the commercial sector. Phase B is intended to ready a program for production; yet 
information technologies are not produced in quantity. Phase C is a production phase, which 
again is generally not relevant to information technology that is not produced in quantity.”27  
Weapon system acquisition processes are often applied to IT systems acquisition, without 
addressing unique aspects of IT. As one witness before the Defense Acquisition Reform panel 
put it, “the weapon systems acquisition process is optimized to manage production risk and does 
not really fit information technology acquisition that does not lead to significant production 
quantities.”28  
 
IT program requirements are often written with overly detailed specifications that are 
inconsistent with the pace of technological change and need for rapid delivery of end-user 
                                                            
26 See Achieving Effective Acquisition of Information Technology  in the Department of Defense 
(http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12823).  In addition to this NRC report, this finding has been echoed by 
a number of other recent studies, including: Defense Information Systems Agency Cooperative Review from 
Business Executives for National Security, August 2008 (http://www.bens.org/mis_support/DISA_Project-
08262008.pdf) and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for 
the Acquisition of Information Technology, March 2009 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA498375.pdf) 
27 Testimony of Mr. Tim Harp delivered at the Panel’s July 9, 2009 hearing entitled, “Challenges to Effective 
Acquisition and Management of Information Technology Systems.” 
28 Testimony of Mr. Tim Harp delivered at the Panel’s July 9, 2009 hearing entitled, “Challenges to Effective 
Acquisition and Management of Information Technology Systems.” 
capabilities.  The “waterfall” process used for large IT systems programs is too document-
intensive, time-consuming and process-bound to respond effectively to end user needs.  Testing 
is also a challenge in IT acquisition.  Testing is integrated too late and serially in current IT 
systems acquisition practices, with testing in realistic operational environments deferred until the 
mandated operational test.  The acquisition community has been reluctant to embrace virtualized 
testing or is overtly precluded from re-using or accessing operationally-relevant test data and 
environments. 
 
As a result, the Department is unable to keep pace with the rate of IT innovation in the 
commercial market place, cannot fully capitalize on IT-based opportunities, and seldom delivers 
IT-based capabilities rapidly. By way of example, the private sector is able to deliver capabilities 
and incrementally improve on those initial deliveries on a 12 to 18 month cycle; defense IT 
systems typically take 48-60 months to deliver. In an environment where technology is obsolete 
after 18 months, defense IT systems are typically two to three generations out of date by the time 
they are delivered. With the exception of IT purchased via vehicles like Enterprise Software 
Initiative contracts, COTS technologies are insufficiently leveraged, excessively tailored, 
inefficiently tested and delayed. 
 
The Panel also notes that the Department can use IT acquisition as a tool for increasing 
the cybersecurity posture of the Department by fostering system diversity. The Department’s 
enterprise IT environment has been described as a monoculture, primarily because there is 
limited diversity of operating systems.  From a management perspective, that makes it easier for 
the Department to purchase and manage the life-cycle of its systems. Unfortunately, this 
monoculture creates an environment that allows potential adversaries to gain a deep 
understanding of vulnerabilities in the enterprise, making attacks potentially much easier and 
more far-reaching than would be the case in a more diverse IT ecosystem.   
  
The Panel notes that improving the acquisition of IT systems should be a high priority for 
the Department. Not only are these systems critical to the daily warfighting and support 
operations of the Department, but IT represents a $33 billion investment that must be overseen 
wisely.  There is a growing recognition that more must be done to differentiate IT acquisition 
processes within the overall acquisition process. Section 804 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the implementation of an alternative process for 
IT acquisition to improve outcomes.  The Panel notes that the authority provided in Section 804 
is primarily intended to address the acquisition and modernization of IT systems.  While 
Congress awaits the implementation plan for this process, the Panel believes there are a number 
of critical issues that should be addressed by this plan  
 
Recommendations Related to IT Acquisition 
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Recommendation 1.1:  The Department in drafting a plan to implement an alternative 
process for IT acquisition should consider the following:29 
 
• The alternative process must include from the start clear performance metrics for specific 
programs, as well as for comparison of programs at an enterprise level. As was pointed out to 
the Panel, “the metrics we have been using have been the financial metrics and the 
acquisition process metrics [and] we have found they don’t work very well in measuring IT 
success.”30 Good metrics in this area have already been developed in the commercial and 
academic sectors. What is needed is a cultural change that emphasizes the capture and 
tracking of metrics integral to the IT acquisition process and additional tools and resources 
for this purpose. 
 
• IT acquisition must involve an ongoing dialogue during the technology development process 
between the system developers, who understand what is technically possible, and the 
warfighters, who understand the requirements and problems to be solved.  This finding is 
consistent with other areas of acquisition, and is addressed more fully later in this report. 
 
• To the maximum extent practical, especially for major IT systems embedded into larger 
weapons systems, the Department should foster an open architecture (OA) approach that 
allows for more modularization of hardware and software. The Navy has implemented open 
architecture in a number of programs, such as the Acoustic COTS Rapid Insertion (ARCI) 
and the Common Submarine Radio Room programs, which bear out the success of this 
model.  Achieving the type of “plug-and-play” approach for hardware and software that OA 
allows would reduce the time and cost currently incurred to modernize systems. It also would 
increase the opportunities for competition across the lifecycle of a system (not just during the 
initial development phase), minimizing the long-term reliance of single source providers for 
capabilities. 
 
• The Department should develop a plan for how to strengthen the IT acquisition workforce, 
especially as it increases the size of the overall acquisition workforce in the coming years, 
including defined targets for billets devoted to IT acquisition, certification levels, and plans 
for developing and maintaining career paths.   The Department also should explore the 
feasibility of developing dedicated cadres of acquisition professionals devoted to IT as a 
means of improving acquisition outcomes. 
 
                                                            
29 Recommendation 1.1 was influenced by testimony delivered by Mr. Tim Harp, Dr. Paul Nielson, and Dr. Ron 
Kerber delivered at the Panel’s July 9, 2009 hearing entitled, “Challenges to Effective Acquisition and Management 
of Information Technology Systems.” 
30 Testimony of Mr. Tim Harp delivered at the Panel’s July 9, 2009 hearing entitled, “Challenges to Effective 
Acquisition and Management of Information Technology Systems.” 
• IT acquisition should include alternative milestone decision points that are more consistent 
with commercial product development for IT.  A new process will affect congressionally-
mandated reporting requirements, but also may require substantial revisions to broader laws, 
such as the Federal Information Security Management Act and the Clinger-Cohen Act. 
 
• The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and Department of Defense 
Instruction 5000.02 emphasize evolutionary acquisition and require competitive prototyping 
in order to improve acquisition outcomes. The current process, though, does not describe 
how to effectively translate competitive prototyping into the IT environment, or how to 
implement evolutionary acquisition for IT. 
 
• Dealing with the issues that arise from integration and testing of commercial products into 
military hardware has been a perennial problem that has not been adequately addressed in the 
past. For IT, that most likely means developing a new test and evaluation approach that 
merges developmental and operational testing in a parallel fashion and includes a greater 
number of small tests, and closely links the test and operational communities. 
 
• IT acquisition should place greater emphasis on the up-front market analysis to best leverage 
limited funds by buying good solutions from the commercial market when they are available, 
and husbanding resources for development for instances when there is no other provider. 
  
• DOD should conduct a more rigorous analysis of contracting mechanisms and contract 
incentive structures to determine which work best for IT acquisitions. Such an analysis 
should include current contracting mechanisms, but also should examine whether there are 
other new mechanisms that should be adopted. 
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Subpart B: Defense Acquisition Policy 
 
While the government-wide Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the associated 
defense supplements to the FAR, apply to the Department’s acquisitions and contain relatively 
detailed guidance relating to the planning, solicitation, and award of contracts, they represent 
only one element of the Department’s acquisition policy.  The FAR and its supplements focus on 
the rules for specific contract actions, and do not establish the kind of overarching strategic 
guidance needed to ensure that the defense acquisition system supports the Department’s 
mission.  The Defense Acquisition Guidebook explains the distinction between the requirements 
of the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02 and the FAR in relation to acquisition 
planning this way:  
 
The FAR requires acquisition planning for all Federal procurements, and the DFARS 
requires PMs to prepare written Acquisition Plans (APs) for most acquisitions exceeding 
$10 million. APs are execution-oriented and tend to contain more contracting-related 
detail than an Acquisition Strategy.  An AP normally relates to a singular contractual 
action, whereas an Acquisition Strategy covers the entire program and may reflect the 
efforts of multiple contractual actions. 
 
For the kind of strategic guidance needed to shape an entire acquisition program, the 
Department’s acquisition policy is captured in two documents:  DODI 5000.1, “The Defense 
Acquisition System,” and DODI 5000.2, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.” 
 
Until very recently, these instructions focused almost exclusively on weapons system 
acquisition and on MDAPs even though information provided to the Panel by the Department in 
2009 indicated that MDAPs constitute less than 20% of the Department’s total acquisition 
spending.  DODI 5000.02 devotes a total of 8 out of 80 pages to the acquisition of services 
compared to 16 pages describing the various stages of acquisition for MDAPs.  The section on 
IT acquisition in DODI 5000.02 is 3 pages and deals largely with the requirements of the Clinger 
Cohen Act and, as mentioned earlier in this report, the milestone process laid out in DODI 
5000.02 is likely inappropriate for use in the acquisition of IT. 
 
Furthermore, while the content of various sections of the current DODI 5000.02 is in 
many cases excellent, there remain serious questions as to whether the policy is being 
implemented.  The DODI 5000.02’s stated preference for evolutionary acquisition has yet to 
demonstrate a real impact on weapons systems acquisition and MDAPs.  The DODI 5000.02 
enclosure providing guidance for the acquisition of services is well written, closely following the 
requirements of section 2330 of title 10, United States Code.  However the Panel found little 
evidence that service contracting professionals were familiar with this guidance.  The Panel’s 
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staff visit to the field indicated that even the Department’s higher performing buying activities 
are only in the early stages of implementing the policy for the acquisition of services. 
 
The FAR itself may have inadequate guidance for services contracting.  Part 37 of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) lays out the regulatory framework for service contracting: 
 
This part prescribes policy and procedures that are specific to the acquisition and 
management of services by contract. This part applies to all contracts for services 
regardless of the type of contract or kind of service being acquired. This part requires the 
use of performance-based contracting to the maximum extent practicable and prescribes 
policies and procedures for use of performance-based contracting methods. 
 
While FAR Part 37 is dedicated to service contracting, references to service contracting 
elsewhere in the FAR are somewhat limited, as noted by the multi-association taskforce.   The 
taskforce recommended that references to service contracting needed to better incorporated 
throughout the FAR – particularly in FAR Parts 7, 8, 12, 13 and 15.31 
                                                            
31 Removing Federal Services Acquisition Barriers And Balancing Public and Private Interest, Multi-Association 
Task Force Report on Service Contracting, May 17. 2005. 
Subpart C: Challenges in Establishing Requirements for Acquisition 
 
The Panel heard at almost every hearing held, regardless of the primary content focus of 
the hearing, that obtaining consistent, realistic requirements as a basis for the acquisition process 
is a critical problem in the defense acquisition system.  Requirements in the weapon system 
acquisition context are governed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS).  The problems with the JCIDS process that the Panel heard about include: 
 
• An inability to meaningfully prioritize. 
 
• An inability to understand the costs and trade-offs inherent in establishing requirements. 
 
• Excessive paperwork and bureaucratic delay in the process of considering new 
requirements. 
 
• A lack of clear communication between those setting requirements and those in the 
acquisition process turning requirements into evaluation criteria and contract 
specifications. 
 
• A lack of sufficient communication on requirements with defense industry necessary to 
allow industry planning for appropriate R&D and capacity investments. 
 
• The achievement of “jointness” by accommodating inputs from all commenters, 
including inputs from those with no resources at stake. 
 
• A lack of capacity on the joint staff devoted to requirements. 
 
• A consistent pattern of “requirements creep” that happens after a JROC-approved 
requirement is established but before and during the period of contract specification and 
execution. 
 
• A lack of ability to monitor “requirements creep” in between program milestones. 
 
• An inability to properly incorporate requirements relating to system sustainability. 
 
The Panel notes that JCIDS, although fulfilling a statutory mandate relating to all joint 
military requirements, generally considers only requirements relating to weapon systems, and 
excludes all consideration of requirements for the acquisition of services, no matter how 
operationally focused they may be.  JCIDS also appears to assume that in cases where a materiel 
solution is required, that some degree of “technology development” will be required to fill a 
capability gap.  Urgent warfighter needs are processed through the alternative, Joint Urgent 
Operational Needs (JUONS) process rather than through JCIDS.  However, a capability gap that 
does not qualify as operationally “urgent” will go through JCIDS even if there could be an off-
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the-shelf material solution.  In this way, JCIDS demonstrates the same bias towards technology 
development and extended timelines as the acquisition process it informs. 
 
In the context of the acquisition of services, problems the Panel heard about in the 
requirements process include: 
 
• A lack of clarity in many instances on who is responsible for establishing requirements. 
• A lack of capacity for establishing requirements in operational commands dependent on 
contractors for performing their mission. 
• A lack of information and analysis necessary to provide a solid analytical foundation for 
a requirement. 
• A lack of clear communication between those setting requirements and those in the 
acquisition process turning requirements into acquisition plans and contract 
specifications. 
 
As noted previously in this report, the Panel believes that the lack of clear lines of 
responsibility in establishing requirements for the acquisition of services is a critical weakness in 
the Department, one which has proven extremely costly in recent operations. 
 
In the context of the acquisition of IT, the Panel finds that the existing requirements 
process is ill suited for the rapidly evolving nature of the IT marketplace which requires an 
iterative dialogue on requirements.  The current process is too inflexible and prone to the kinds 
of over-specification that has long been an issue in weapon systems requirements.  In the context 
of the acquisition of commercial goods and commodities, the Panel finds that the requirements 
process depends on a supply chain management system that simply doesn’t function with the 
level of precision required for determining requirements. 
 
The Panel notes that two observations about the requirements process appear to hold true 
across the entire range of acquisition categories.  First, the analytical basis for establishing 
requirements is at best insufficient and is occasionally almost nonexistent.  Second, the 
requirements process is simply not currently designed to support the kind of iterative dialogue 
with the acquisition process that is needed to ensure that the acquisition process remains focused 
on real operational needs.  In the context of weapon systems acquisition there should be a critical 
distinction between Key Performance Parameters, which are rarely modified, and the range of 
lesser requirements which can and should be re-tuned much more frequently throughout the 
acquisition process.  Even the nomenclature of a “requirement” may insert a rigidity to these 
lesser priority items that is unwarranted.  The Panel notes, however, that it is critical that the 
purpose of this iterative requirements dialogue should be for clarifying the true operational 
warfighter needs, not in creating more opportunities to insert additional requirements in the 
acquisition process. 
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PART II:  THE BASIC ANSWER – WHO FIXES IT AND HOW 
 
 Given the diversity and complexity of the defense acquisition system and the significant 
challenges identified by the Panel as described in Part I of this report, the question becomes who 
can fix the system and how.  The Panel believes that its findings are consistent with those 
articulated by Secretary Gates, who has argued that there is “no silver bullet” for fixing the 
defense acquisition system.32  The Panel believes that the correct response is to provide the 
senior leaders of the Department with a suite of tools useful in identifying and correcting a range 
of problems throughout the system.  Central to this effort is the establishment of a 
comprehensive means of assessing performance in acquisition to enable the Department’s senior 
leaders to manage performance in the defense acquisition system. 
 
Subpart A: Creating a Comprehensive Performance Assessment and Audit Function for 
Defense Acquisition – Recommendations  
 
From the beginning of its work, the Panel focused on the question of how the Department 
measures performance in the defense acquisition system.  The Panel was established in part in 
reaction to GAO’s finding that DOD had experienced cost growth of $296 billion on major 
defense acquisition programs as of January 2009.  Tellingly, although all of the information 
required to compile this metric was generated by the Department in its Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs), it was GAO that “discovered” this information and reported it to Congress.  
Then USD AT&L John Young later disputed the accuracy and relevance of this overall total of 
MDAP cost growth.  However, the Department’s analysis was a sui generis effort that had never 
before been undertaken to analyze the overall data on MDAPs being generated in SARs.  The 
Department had no performance management system in place to generate and analyze systematic 
data of this nature.  In fact, the Panel heard direct testimony from witnesses that in many cases, 
senior Department officials are unaware of significant acquisition problems until they are 
disclosed by GAO audits33  The Panel was left with little comfort that the Department’s leaders 
have the processes and tools in place to routinely identify such issues through internal review 
and reporting today.  The Panel concludes that the Department needs a strong internal 




32 Secretary Gates comment as relayed by  Dr. Ash Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics in the speech entitled “Where is Defense Acquisition and Where Do You See It Going,” delivered 
November 3, 2009 at PEO/SYSCOM, Ft. Belvoir, VA. 
33 Testimony of Mr. Jeffrey Parsons delivered at the Panel’s hearing of July 16, 2009 entitled “Managing Service 
Contracts: What Works and What Doesn’t?” 
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Recommendation 2.1:  Congress should expand the role of the Office of Performance 
Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) to operate as an auditable performance 
assessment capability for the entire defense acquisition system.34   
 
Section 103 of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) led DOD 
to create the Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA).  
Congressional intent in directing the establishment of this position was to establish a capability 
to identify, promulgate policy for, and track a series of meaningful metrics about performance in 
the defense acquisition system: metrics that would serve to allow the Department’s leaders to 
manage the defense acquisition system rather than simply serve as a brake on the activities of the 
military departments on a limited subset of major programs.  As with other provisions in 
WSARA, however, the mandate of PARCA was specified as being in relation to MDAPs only 
since this was the scope of that Act.  As a result, PARCA as it exists today, while a useful and 
essential new capability, does not fulfill the Panel’s recommendation 2.1. 
 
Recommendation 2.2:  PARCA should report to the USD AT&L and also to the Chief 
Management Officer (CMO), through the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO), 
and should be responsible for performing assessments, and maintaining performance 
assessment information, across the entire defense acquisition system.  PARCA would 
oversee similar organizations within the military departments which would report jointly 
to the CMO and the Services Acquisition Executive (SAE) of the military department.35   
 
The Panel notes that the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2011 sets a government-wide 
goal to improve government performance management: 
 
To improve the performance of the federal government in the coming fiscal year and in 
years to come, the Administration will pursue three mutually reinforcing performance 
management strategies: 
 
1. Use Performance Information to Lead, Learn, and Improve Outcomes. 
Agency leaders set a few high-priority goals and use constructive data-based 
reviews to keep their organizations on track to deliver on these objectives. 
2. Communicate Performance Coherently and Concisely for Better Results and 
Transparency.  The federal government will candidly communicate to the public 
the priorities, problems, and progress of government programs, explaining the 
reasons behind past trends, the impact of past actions, and future plans.  In 
                                                            
34 Recommendation 2.1 was influenced by Chairman Andrews input to the Panel on the importance of having an 
auditable mechanism for measuring performance and providing accountability 
35 Recommendation 2.2 builds on provisions in WSARA that were a result of input from the Panel in the drafting of 
that Act. 
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addition, agencies will strengthen their capacity to learn from experience and 
experiments. 
3. Strengthen Problem-Solving Networks. The federal government will tap into 
and encourage practitioner communities, inside and outside government, to work 
together to improve outcomes and performance management practices.”36  
 
Each federal agency is tasked to identify a Performance Improvement Officer.  At the 
Department, this role is fulfilled by the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO), a statutory 
position created by section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
(Public Law 110-108).  The DCMO works with the military departments and defense agencies to 
oversee and coordinate their performance management efforts.  The Panel notes that as part of 
this effort, the Department has identified Reform of the Acquisition Process as one of its 10 high 
priority performance goals for Fiscal Year 2011.  In the case of acquisition, the Panel believes 
that a coordinated effort between the DCMO and the USD AT&L is needed to develop concrete 
measurable performance goals for all of the PEOs and buying activities in the defense acquisition 
system. 
 
As with other areas of acquisition discussed in this report and as mentioned earlier, the 
systems within the Department for the evaluation and audit of program performance, such as 
they are, developed out of and remain extensively focused on the acquisition of weapon systems.  
In recent years, in response to sections 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006 and Section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 
DOD has begun to extend performance evaluation concepts to services contracting.   DOD 
briefed the Panel that it’s policy guidance requires that services contracts be let “based on clear, 
performance based requirements; include identifiable and measurable cost, schedule, and 
performance outcomes consistent with customer needs; receive adequate planning and 
management; and use a strategic, enterprise-wide approach for both planning and execution of 
the acquisition”.37  Panel staff followed up on this issue during a field visit to Army and Air 
Force services contracting activities.  These visits revealed that the military departments are in 
only the early stages of implementing the guidance on the acquisition of services at a relatively 
small number of centers of excellence, and furthermore, that there are limited systems below the 
level of the major command for tracking and monitoring the implementation of this policy. 
 
One of the primary tools the Department does use for performance measurement (though 
not currently for true performance management) is the Earned Value Management System 
(EVMS).  USD AT&L Dr. Ash Carter recently reported to Congress that the Department intends 
to improve EVMS and expand on its use to allow for it to become a true performance 
                                                            
36 The President’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2011, “Analytical Perspectives/Performance and Management,” 
Page 73. 
37  Briefing to the Panel by Shay Assad, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, March 23, 
2009 
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management tool. 38  EVMS has experienced a number of issues, notably with contractor 
implementation and data quality.  However, for the Panel’s purposes, the most significant 
limitations are that EVMS only measures the performance of a contractor, not of the organization 
which is managing the acquisition.  Furthermore, EVMS would generate no negative information 
about a contractor performing on cost, on schedule, and meeting all contract requirements even if 
(or perhaps especially if) the contract in question had a wildly inflated price or a schedule or set 
of contract requirements that utterly failed to meet warfighter needs.  Thus, EVMS while a 
valuable tool is not sufficient to fulfill the Panel’s recommendations.  As noted earlier in this 
report, CPARS is a similar, and similarly incomplete tool for fulfilling these recommendations. 
 
Recommendation 2.3:  All Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and buying activities should 
negotiate specific measurable goals with their senior acquisition executive relating, at a 
minimum, to cost, quality, delivery, acquisition workforce quality (including program 
manager tenure where relevant), quality of market research, small business utilization, and 
utilization of acquisition best practices.  In cases where they are unable to negotiate a set of 
goals by consensus, the senior acquisition executive’s recommendation would take 
precedence.39   
 
As discussed previously in this report, the Panel is well aware that the diversity of the 
defense acquisition system means that performance metrics must necessarily be tailored to the 
nature of the acquisition concerned (e.g. services, commodities, weapon systems, etc.)  However, 
the Panel believes that in the realm of acquisition, DOD has had success in identifying measures 
of cost performance, quality, and delivery as common standards across the defense acquisition 
system.  It is the Panel’s view that while these measures may not be directly comparable between 
a services contract and a weapon system, it is nonetheless true in both instances that such metrics 
are independently valid and useful. 
 
In addition to performance measures that track how a PEO/buying activity manages its 
contractors such as cost, quality, and delivery, the Panel believes that the proposed PARCA 
performance management function can be utilized to improve the extent to which PEOs and 
buying activities follow important elements of defense acquisition policy by utilizing measures 
that evaluate their compliance with these policies.  The panel believes that chief among the 
metrics that should be developed in this area are acquisition workforce quality (including 
program manager tenure where relevant), quality of market research, small business utilization 
(including usage of technologies developed under the Small Business Innovative Research 
                                                            
38 “Department of Defense Earned Value Management: Performance Oversight and Governance,” September 1, 
2009, page iii. 
39 Recommendation 2.3 was influenced by Chairman Andrew’s input to the Panel on establishing performance 
measure for cost, quality and delivery and by his input on a mechanism for resolving impasses.    Recommendation 
2.3 was also influenced by Representative Cooper’s input on the need to track the use and benefits of SBIR 
technologies, and Representative Coffman’s input on the need for balanced and adequate testing in support of 
acquisition. 
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program), utilization of acquisition best practices (e.g. avoiding unsuitable contract types, 
evolutionary acquisition and integrated testing approaches)  
 
The exact nature of the goal for each performance measure should be negotiated between 
the PEO/buying activity and PARCA.  In cases where the program office/buying activity and 
PARCA disagree on the goals to be set in a given year, PARCA’s recommendation would 
prevail though the PEO/buying activity should be given the opportunity to ask the USD AT&L 
to review the decision. 
 
Recommendation 2.4:  Performance assessments must be directly linked to positive 
incentives and consequences that reward high performing activities and reform or shift 
responsibilities away from low performing activities.  Given the nature of the rewards and 
consequences recommended, performance assessments for each activity will have to be 
performed regularly.40   
 
The Panel believes performance assessments will truly become performance management 
tools when coupled directly with positive incentives and consequences for the activities being 
managed.  It is therefore essential that these performance measures be tied directly to positive 
incentives, such as the size of bonus pools available for personnel of the PEO/buying activity and 
the timing of promotions.  In the case of poor performing activities, consequences would include 
reduced bonus pools, and possible transfer of some acquisition responsibilities to other 
organizations until the activity demonstrated the capacity to perform its assigned workload up to 
the Department’s performance standards. 
                                                            
40 Recommendation 2.4 was influenced by Chairman Andrews, Representative Cooper, Representative Coffman, 
and Representative Ellsworth’s input on the need for enhanced accountability in the management of the defense 
acquisition system. 
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Subpart B:  Establishing Clear Lines of Authority for Setting Acquisition Requirements -- 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 2.5:  The Department should ensure that the input of USD AT&L, the 
Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the Combatant 
Commanders (COCOMs) is meaningfully considered in Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) discussions.41   
 
The Panel notes that WSARA added USD AT&L, CAPE, and COCOM input to the 
JROC process to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance objectives are 
being made in the requirements process.  The Department should continue to monitor the 
effectiveness of the current non-voting membership of USD AT&L and CAPE and the 
sufficiency of input from the COCOMs to determine if these entities should be formally made 
members of the JROC. 
 
Recommendation 2.6:  The Department should establish reform of the requirements 
process as a top performance management priority and appoint the Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve performance in the system across the entire range of 
requirements that affect the defense acquisition system.42   
 
The Panel believes that the process of setting requirements for acquisition is so critical to 
the Department’s mission that it should be added to the list of the Department’s performance 
management goals as a top priority.  The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be 
appointed as goal leader for this effort.  For the current JCIDS process, at a minimum, the 
Department should monitor the timeliness of action in the requirements process, the quality of 
the requirements workforce, cost realism, the degree of prioritization in establishing 
requirements, and the utilization of meaningful sustainment requirements.  The Panel also 
believes that there should be a clear statutory mandate to establish guidance for the setting of 
requirements for the acquisition of services and that the service chiefs should work to improve 
the requirements setting process for commercial goods and commodities. 
 
Recommendation 2.7:  The Department and Congress should review and clarify the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act’s separation between acquisition and the military service chiefs to 
allow detailed coordination and interaction between the requirements and acquisition 
                                                            
41 Recommendation 2.5 was influenced by Representative Cooper’s input on the need to integrate the acquisition 
expertise of USD AT&L and the COCOMs in the JROC process. 
42 Recommendation 2.6 was influenced by Representatives Cooper and Conaway’s input on the need to improve the 
requirements process and reduce requirements creep. 
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processes and to encourage enhanced military service chief participation in contract 
quality assurance.43   
 
The Panel is concerned that the divide established in the Goldwater-Nichols Act between 
acquisition and the military service chiefs has become so wide that it hinders both the acquisition 
and requirements process.  While the fundamental construct in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
correctly assigned lead responsibility for acquisition to the Department’s civilian leaders, the Act 
should be clarified to ensure that the requirements processes that must coordinate with all 
categories of the defense acquisition system freely interacts with the acquisition process.  The 
service chiefs should also be given greater authority and responsibility to oversee contract 
quality assurance especially for contracts that are highly operational in nature. 
 
Recommendation 2.8:  The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should designate a COCOM 
as the end-user capability proponent for all MDAPs.  The COCOM would designate a 
subordinate unit within the command as a Joint Evaluation Task Force (JETF).44    
 
To ensure that the appropriate degree of dialogue occurs between the acquisition 
community and the warfighter in the acquisition of weapon systems, the Vice Chairman should 
designate a COCOM as the end-user capability proponent (Combat Developer) for all MDAPs.  
The COCOM would designate a subordinate unit within the command as a JETF, with the 
responsibility of providing ongoing end-user requirements feedback to the program manager.  
The services’ traditional requirements organizations would provide a secretariat function for the 




43 Recommendation 2.7 was influenced by Representatives Cooper, Ellsworth’s input on the need to revisit the 
division of responsibilities of USD AT&L, service secretaries, and service chiefs under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
44 Recommendation 2.8 was influenced by Representative Cooper’s input on the need to better incorporate the input 
of COCOMs in the requirements process. 
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Subpart C:  Better Match Defense Acquisition Policy to the Defense Acquisition System -- 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 2.9:  The Department needs to improve the communication of its policy 
guidance on service contracting and reexamine DODI 5000.02 and related guidance to 
ensure that mandates and requirements that are particular to the acquisition of weapon 
systems are not being inappropriately applied to other areas of acquisition, particularly the 
acquisition of services and information technology.45   
 
The Panel believes that the Department’s acquisition guidance has too extensive a focus 
on technology development in relation to its focus on the core acquisition function.  As discussed 
in Part I of this report, the Panel believes that a detailed instruction for the acquisition of 
information technology should be developed as an alternative to the process for weapon systems 
outlined in DODI 5000.02. 
 
Recommendation 2.10:  The Department should develop guidance for formally 
communicating information on the Department’s mission needs with industry that is 
independent of specific acquisition program and contracts. 46   
 
The purpose of this dialogue would be to provide industry with the insight needed to 




45 Recommendation 2.9 was influenced by Representative Andrews input on the need for defense acquisition policy 
to comprehensively address the entire defense acquisition system, not just weapon system acquisition. 
46 Recommendation 2.10 was influenced by Representative Coffman’s input on the need to maintain a healthy 
industrial base and increase predictability for industry. 
Subpart D: Address Negative Financial Incentives such as Obligation and Expenditure 
Benchmarks 
 
 The Panel consulted with a number of members of the defense acquisition workforce, in 
both formal and informal sessions.  One of the concerns expressed by program and business 
managers was the effect of obligation and expenditure benchmarks on spending and funding 
stability.  
 
Obligations are considered to be funds placed on contract at the time a contract is signed 
or subsequently modified.  In essence, these funds represent the maximum amount of funding 
available for activities within the scope of the contract, or the government’s maximum liability 
under the contract.  Funds are not expended (“expenditures”) until the contractor presents the 
government with a voucher for activities performed or material ordered under the contract and a 
check or electronic funds transfer is sent back to the contractor.  
 
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Comptrollers of the military 
departments establish benchmarks as a guide for managing appropriations. These benchmarks 
are used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and higher headquarters within a 
Service to compare actual obligations and expenditures to these established goals, in order to 
identify high-performing programs, troubled programs, potentially forward-financed programs, 
and programs that may be bill payers for higher priority requirements.  Thus, the benchmarks 
will conform to, but are not the same as the legal “life” of various appropriations – the time by 
which a type of appropriation must be spent before the funds expire.  For example, 
appropriations law makes research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds available 
for obligation for two years and requires expenditure within 5 years.  However, OSD 
benchmarks require 80% of RDT&E funds to be obligated within the first year, with 55% of 
such funds expended in the first year and 90% by the end of the second. 
 
Current OSD benchmarks are shown in the table below*.  Each of the Services 
benchmarks vary, but are typically set several percentage points higher than the OSD goal.  Both 








 Obligation      Expenditure Obligation      Expenditure Obligation      Expenditure
O&M 100%            ------- N/A              ------- N/A               ------- 
RDT&E 80%               55% 100%            90% N/A               ------- 
Procurement 80%              ------- 96%              ------- 100%             ------- 
Advanced 
Procurement 
100%            ------- N/A               ------- N/A               ------- 
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*Notes: 
1. Where percentages are shown, these represent “end-of-year” benchmarks against 
which the specific appropriation account could be measured by OSD.  
2. A “---” in a column indicates no specific OSD benchmark. 
3. A “N/A” in a column indicates that 100% should have already been achieved. 
 
The concern expressed by certain program and business managers is that these 
benchmarks may drive spending ahead of need, solely to comply with the benchmarks.  
Managers may feel under pressure to sign contracts (obligating the funds) prior to reaching a set 
of negotiated terms that are in the best interest of the government.  Likewise, managers may feel 
compelled to approve vouchers for payment that would otherwise warrant further scrutiny or 
approve unnecessary activities, in order to improve expenditure rates.  Furthermore, should 
managers not meet these benchmarks, they run the risk of having previously appropriated funds 
rescinded or funds programmed for the following year removed.  The loss of funds in the year of 
execution or in the next fiscal year may inject instability into the program that can actually drive 
cost increases.   
 
The Panel also recognizes, however, that the Department will always face unanticipated 
requirements that must be funded.  It is reasonable that these emerging, higher priority needs can 
be paid for by shifting funds away from programs that will not be able to use their appropriations 
as planned.  A benchmark system of some sort is a reasonable yardstick for identifying an initial 
list of candidates for further evaluation. 
 
Recommendations Related to Obligations and Expenditures 
 
Recommendation 2.11:  The Department and each of the military services should review all 
relevant policy and instruction regarding obligation and expenditure benchmarks to 
ensure that such guidance does not inadvertently create adverse compliance.  In addition, 
as part of the training that all program managers and business managers receive, the 
purpose and limitations of benchmarks should be made clear.47   
 
Managers should be encouraged to place a higher priority on seeking the best value for 
the government than on meeting arbitrary benchmarks for spending.  These behaviors should be 
supported by the Department’s leadership at every level. 
 
Recommendation 2.12:  The Under Sectary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Comptrollers 
of the military departments should rely more on individual obligation and expenditure 
                                                            
47 Recommendation 2.11 was influenced by the comments of members of the defense acquisition workforce 
attending the Defense Acquisition University who attended a roundtable discussion with members of the Panel on 
November 19, 2009 and by the input of Representative Coffman on the need to promote program stability. 
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plans for measuring program financial performance.48   
 
Services and Defense Agencies already require subordinate organizations to submit 
written obligation plans and expenditure plans (known as “spending plans”) for all 
appropriations for which they have received funding. These plans are required to forecast – on a 
month by month basis – when funds are expected to be obligated and expended.  Then, during 
the period of execution, actual obligations and expenditures are tracked in monthly reports.  In 
addition, program managers are generally required to report on these actual and planned 
obligations and expenditures as part of the quarterly reviews or briefings to their Program 
Executive Officer.  Given that program managers receive training on the content of these 
individual spending plans and that they are already used to track progress at a lower level, higher 
commands should place greater reliance on these customized measures of performance rather 
than arbitrary standards. 
 
Recommendation 2.13:  PARCA should study the issue of obligation and expenditure 
benchmarks further and propose new benchmarks/processes for tracking financial 




48 Recommendation 2.12 was influenced by the comments of members of the defense acquisition workforce 
attending the Defense Acquisition University who attended a roundtable discussion with members of the Panel on 
November 19, 2009 and by the input of Representative Coffman on the need to promote program stability.. 
49 Recommendation 2.13 was influenced by the comments of members of the defense acquisition workforce 
attending the Defense Acquisition University who attended a roundtable discussion with members of the Panel on 
November 19, 2009 and by the input of Representative Coffman on the need to promote program stability.. 
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PART III:  THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 
 
The Department of Defense is probably the largest buying enterprise in the world.   From 
fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2008, the Department’s annual purchase of goods and services 
more than doubled to $388 billion.  The number of contract actions also increased significantly 
and grew in dollar value and complexity.  Yet, the size of the acquisition workforce within the 
government remained relatively steady over that timeframe, between 126,000 and 129,000 
government personnel.50   
 
During the post-Cold War drawdown in the mid- to late 1990s, Congress imposed a 
series of reductions to the overall size of the acquisition workforce in an effort to downsize that 
workforce commensurate with reductions being experienced in the workforce department-
wide.51  There has been on-going debate over whether the cuts were too large, and whether they 
were well-managed.  Notwithstanding the debate over the impact those personnel reductions had 
on the quality and composition of the acquisition workforce, the Department’s procurement 
budget has increased significantly, as did the number of contract actions it undertook.   
 
Ensuring that the acquisition workforce is adequately staffed, skilled and trained, and 
improving the workforce’s quality and performance are as important as improvements to 
acquisition processes and structures.  Since 1992, GAO has identified the Department of 
Defense’s contract management as a high risk area, and in its latest update reiterated that the 
Department needs to take appropriate action to ensure that its acquisition workforce is 
adequately sized, trained, and equipped to meet the Department’s needs.  As GAO has noted, “at 
times….DOD’s acquisitions have not resulted in the desired outcomes. The lack of well-defined 
requirements, the use of ill-suited business arrangements, and the lack of an adequate number of 
trained acquisition and contract oversight personnel contribute to unmet expectations and 
continue to place the Department at risk of potentially paying more than necessary,” not to 
mention increasing the Department’s exposure to fraud, waste, and abuse.52   
 
The Department and the military services contend that they are working to determine the 
right mix of technical know-how, subject matter expertise, and general business skills that is 
needed within the workforce as well as the right balance between military and civilian personnel 
and between government and contractor personnel.53   The Department’s Human Capital 
                                                            
50 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Additional Actions and Data are Needed to Effectively Manage and 
Oversee DOD’s Acquisition Workforce, GAO-09-342   
51 Defense Acquisition Workforce:  Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (98-
938F), Updated March 11, 1999  
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, High Risk Series, An Update, January 2009, GAO-09-271 
53 Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Human Capital Plan, June 2007    
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Strategic Plan for the acquisition workforce identifies maintaining a “high performing, agile, and 
ethical workforce” as the “number one priority.”54  
 
Addressing these issues is particularly critical now since the budget request for Fiscal 
Year 2011 continues support for the Department’s plan, announced in April of last year, to scale 
back significantly the role of contractors in support services; this plan also was reinforced in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review.  A specific focus of the insourcing effort is in acquisition where, 
by 2011, the Department intends to decrease its reliance on contract services in acquisition 
functions by increasing in-house civilian and military personnel by 4,765 authorizations for 
positions.  By 2011, the Department will increase the total number of civilian and military 
personnel performing acquisition functions by 10,025 total personnel (end strength); the 
acquisition workforce will grow to 147,000 total personnel by 2015. 
 
Over the past decade or more, Congress has included a number of provisions in annual 
authorization legislation providing direction relating to the size, composition, quality and 
performance of the defense acquisition workforce.  
 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.  To address concerns related to workforce 
quality, in 1990, Congress passed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA), which aimed to formally establish the acquisition workforce and increase its 
professionalism.  In developing the legislation, the House Armed Services Committee considered 
the “three distinct elements within DOD’s Acquisition System: (1) the policies, procedures, and 
processes which govern the operation of the acquisition system; (2) the organization of the 
resources (people, management structure, capital, and facilities) that execute the policies and 
procedures; and (3) the people within the organization that make the system work.”55  DAWIA 
also mandated certain training and certification requirements, and created the Defense 
Acquisition University to provide for the professional educational development and training of 
the acquisition workforce.  
 
Special Projects Acquisition Team.  Section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314) established a “quick reaction special projects acquisition 
team.”  The objective of the team was to examine and address issues affecting expeditious 
procurements.  Specifically, it was intended that the team would look at industrial base issues, 
the lengthy acquisition process due to potentially burdensome regulations as well as 
environmental and small business issues.   
 
                                                            
54 AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan, “A Message for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics.” 
55 The Quality and Professionalism of the Acquisition Workforce, Subcommittee on Investigations, May 8, 1990   
Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund.  Section 852 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) established a workforce 
development fund dedicated to the recruitment, training, and retention of acquisition workforce 
personnel to make certain the Department has the capacity, in both personnel and skills, to 
provide appropriate oversight of contractor performance, and ensure that the Department 
receives the best value for the expenditure of public resources. Department and Service officials 
responsible for managing the acquisition workforce view the existence of the fund positively, 
describing it as a “jump start” to the acquisition workforce hiring initiative announced by 
Secretary Gates.  Section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
allowed the Department to use the fund to hire current DOD employees from outside the 
acquisition workforce into the acquisition workforce, and the Department is currently seeking the 
ability to use the fund for promotions as well. 
 
Government Performance of Critical Acquisition Function.  Section 820 of the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364) directed the 
Department to establish a goal that, within five years, the following positions for major defense 
acquisition programs and major automated information systems be filled by government 
personnel (military or civilian personnel):  (1) program manager; (2) deputy program manager; 
(3) chief engineer; (4) systems engineer; and (5) cost estimator.  This provision required the 
Secretary to develop a plan of action to recruit, train, and ensure the career development of such 
personnel and to report annually to the defense committees on the progress in achieving the goal.   
 
Strategic Human Capital Plan.  Section 851 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008 (Public Law 110-81) required the inclusion of a separate chapter on the acquisition 
workforce in the annual DOD strategic human capital plan.  This chapter would include a 
description of the budgets programmed for training and an assessment of whether such funds 
were adequate as well as an assessment of the skill mix within the acquisition workforce and the 
incentives needed to recruit and retain a highly skilled workforce.  The requirement for a 
strategic human capital plan, including separate chapters on the acquisition workforce and senior 
management, functional and technical workforce, was codified in section 1108 of the FY 2010 
NDAA (Public Law 110-84).  
 
Expedited Hiring Authority.  In the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417), Congress gave the Department expedited hiring 
authority to forego standard competition requirements to fill acquisition positions within the 
Department that have been designated as facing critical shortages (section 833). The Department 
issued guidance in December 2008 and the Services are beginning to use the authority, which 
allows them to avoid the standard process which can take months to produce a job offer for 
suitable candidates to instead make a job offer in as little as three days.   
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Career Path and Other Requirements for Military Personnel in the Acquisition Field.  The FY 
2009 NDAA (section 834) also required the Department to establish policies and guidance to 
ensure “the proper development, assignment, and employment of members of the armed forces 
in the acquisition field.”  The provision directs the Department to develop a career path aimed at 
attracting the highest quality candidates with opportunities for command and senior 
noncommissioned officer positions.  The legislation requires that the Department have the 
number of qualified and trained military needed to ensure the “optimum management of the 
acquisition function” and “the appropriate use of military personnel in contingency contacting.”    
The provision also expressly required that a sufficient number of general and flag officer 
positions be reserved to ensure that military personnel have the opportunity for advancement and 
promotion in the acquisition field.    
 
Recommendations Related to the Acquisition Workforce 
 
Recommendation 3.1:  The Department should establish a clear and attractive career path 
for civilians in acquisition, in addition to military personnel, in the acquisition field.56    
 
DAWIA called upon the Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to “ensure that appropriate career paths for civilian and 
military personnel who wish to pursue careers in acquisition are identified in terms of the 
education, training, experience, and assignments necessary for career progression of civilians 
and members of the armed forces to the most senior acquisition positions. “  The Gansler 
Commission report on the Army clearly showed that the DAWIA mandate for the military had 
fallen short.  As a result, Congress took steps (as noted above) to require the development of 
career paths for military personnel.  The Panel believes that similar emphasis and focus must be 
re-instated for civilians.   
 
The Department’s need for acquisition personnel extends beyond contracting officials to 
system engineers, development planners, software engineers, cost estimators, developmental 
testers, product support managers, and other highly skilled professionals.  The quality of the new 
employees is at least as important as the quantity.  The Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense 
Authorization Act included a provision (section 1112) that authorizes the development of a 
leadership recruitment and development program (the Defense Civilian Leadership Program).  
The program should provide the DOD with an important tool to recruit individuals with the 
academic merit, work experience and demonstrated leadership skills necessary to build the most 
effective acquisition workforce possible.   
 
                                                            
56 Recommendation 3.1 was influenced by Representative Coffman’s input on the need to recruit, train, and retain a 
professional and experienced acquisition workforce. 
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Recommendation 3.2:  The Department should fully implement the performance 
management and hiring reforms provided in Section 1113(d) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.57  
 
      The Department needs flexibility to efficiently hire qualified new employees, and to 
manage its workforce in a manner that promotes superior performance; this is a particularly 
critical aspect of acquisition accountability.  Section 1113(d) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84) authorized the Secretary, in 
coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, to develop new 
regulations for the civilian workforce which include fair, credible, and transparent methods for 
hiring and assigning personnel, and for appraising employee performance.  As noted in the 
statement of managers accompanying the conference report accompanying the FY10 NDAA, the 
Department should be able to exercise these flexibilities consistent with the existing General 
Schedule (GS) pay system, without the need for any legislative change to that system – although 
regulatory revisions, or internal policy guidance, may be needed.  Such flexibilities would 
include quality step increases, cash awards for performance, various non-cash incentive awards 
(such as compensatory time), recruitment and retention flexibilities, etc.  However, the Panel 
recognizes and is willing to consider legislation that might be needed to address pay increases or 
bonus payments, classification or other issues related to the GS system that might hinder the 
ability of the Department to implement a fair and transparent performance management system.  
The Panel further notes that members of the acquisition workforce who consistently fail to meet 
performance standards should also face consequences for poor performance with appropriate 
procedures for warnings during performance evaluations and due process. 
Continuing training for managers and supervisors also is a key element of Section 
1113(d), which requires the development of special training programs, and requires managers 
and supervisors to complete the program every three years.  Areas of focus for the training 
program includes strategies for conducting performance appraisals and improving employee 
performance and productivity, and methods for assisting with career and professional 
development, and mentoring and motivating employees. 
The Panel believes that the federal employee unions representing the acquisition 
workforce are critical partners in the development and implementation of performance 
management, hiring and training reforms.  In that regard, the Panel expects the Department to 
comply fully with the requirements of Chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, as set forth in 
section 1113(d).  
 
                                                            
57 Recommendation 3.2 was influenced by Chairman Andrews and Representative Cooper’s input on the need to 
create meaningful rewards and incentives and accountability for the acquisition workforce. 
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Recommendation 3.3:  The Department should incorporate lessons learned from and 
consider extending the Acquisition Workforce Demonstration Program.58   
 
The Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to undertake a demonstration program 
to determine the feasibility or desirability of various proposals for improving personnel 
management policies and procedures that apply to the acquisition workforce, and supporting 
personnel.  This is currently a five year program, limited to 120,000, which expires in 2012.  The 
Department should extend the successful elements of this program using the acquisition 
workforce as a model for managing its human capital. 
 
Recommendation 3.4:  The Department should mandate clear responsibility for the 
military services (service secretaries and service chiefs) to staff and train their buying 
activities appropriately to meet performance standards.59    
 
As part of this effort, the military services should enhance their incentive programs that 
encourage employees to seek cost savings.  For example, the Navy and Air Force each have 
programs that make cash awards or personal decorations to employees that make suggestions for 
savings or process improvements that benefit their organization.   
 
Labor and management together should develop organization goals (e.g., for cost savings, 
efficiency improvements, etc) that, if met, would provide rewards that are shared across the 
component.   This promotes and rewards teamwork, and allows employees to focus on factors 
that they actually have some control over.   
 
Recommendation 3.5:  The Department should require periodic recertification/mandatory 
continuing education for members of the workforce previously certified.60   
 
While the Department has established a certification process, through DAWIA, to 
advance contracting personnel, there appears to be no requirement for periodic renewal of an 
individual’s certification.  There are requirements to participate in continuous learning, but 
nothing that mandates what those courses must be in to keep the certification up-to-date.   In 
addition, a greater focus in training also should be placed in the areas of services contracting, 
information technology, and rapid acquisition.  
 
                                                            
58 Recommendation 3.3 was influence by Chairman Andrews and Representative Cooper’s input on the need to 
develop and adopt flexibilities for the management of the acquisition workforce. 
59 Recommendation 3.4 was influenced by Representatives Cooper and Ellsworth’s input on the need to clarify the 
accountability of the military service chiefs for managing the acquisition workforce. 
60 Recommendation 3.5 was influenced by Representative Coffman’s input on the need to train and retain a 
professional and experienced acquisition workforce.  And by testimony of Dr. Daniel Nussbaum received at the 
Panel’s hearing on May 19, 2009 entitled “Measuring Performance:  Developing Good Acquisition Metrics.” 
 Furthermore, specific focus should be given to courses in cost estimating.  According to 
Dr. Daniel Nussbaum of the Naval Postgraduate School, cost estimating is not included in any 
undergraduate curricula.  Courses taught on financial economics do not address the underlying 
sources for cost estimating.  Yet sound cost estimating is essential to the acquisition process.  
Improved training – and certification requirements – in cost estimating should be considered a 
core acquisition requirement.  Consideration should be given to a cost estimating intern program.  
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PART IV:  FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT READINESS 
 
GAO has repeatedly reported on the vulnerability of the Department’s financial 
management systems.  In its most recent update to its High Risk series, GAO found that, 
“Weaknesses in DOD’s financial management adversely affect not only the reliability of reported 
financial data, but also the efficiency and effectiveness of its business operations. Transforming 
DOD's financial management operations to provide timely, reliable, accurate, and useful 
information for management operations, including financial reporting and decision making, is a 
significant challenge. To date, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Civil Works has achieved an 
unqualified audit opinion on its financial statements. However, none of the military services have 
received favorable financial statement audit opinions, and the department has annually 
acknowledged that long-standing pervasive weaknesses in its business systems, processes, and 
controls have prevented auditors from determining the reliability of reported financial statement 
information.” 
 
The Panel remains concerned that the inability to provide accurate and timely financial 
information prevents the Department from adequately managing its acquisition programs and 
from implementing true acquisition reform. The implications of poor financial management 
stretch beyond the Department of Defense.  Indeed, given that the Department is the largest 
agency in the federal government, owning 86 percent of the government’s assets (estimated at 
$4.6 trillion), it is essential that the Department maintain strong financial management and 
business systems that allow for comprehensive auditing, in order to improve financial 
management government-wide and to achieve an unqualified audit opinion not only on the 
Department’s financial statements, but also on the U.S. Government’s consolidated financial 
statements. 
 
Several major pieces of legislation, such as the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 
1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 
(Public Law 104–208) have required published financial statement audits, reporting by auditors 
regarding whether the Department’s financial management systems comply substantially with 
federal accounting standards, and other measures intended to ensure financial management 
systems provide accurate, reliable, and timely financial management information.  In response to 
a congressional mandate, the Department issued its first biennial Financial Improvement and 
Audit Readiness Plan in December 2005, to delineate its strategy for addressing financial 
management challenges and achieving clean audit opinions.  This 2005 report projected that 69% 
of assets and 80% of liabilities would be “clean” by 2009; yet in the March 2009 report, the 
Department projects it will have only achieved an unqualified audit on 45% of its assets and 
liabilities by 2009.  Unfortunately, the Department is falling behind its original plan to achieve 
full compliance with the law by 2017.  
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In response to the regression in the Department’s compliance, last year Congress passed a 
more detailed statutory requirement for the Secretary to develop a plan to ensure that the 
financial statements of the Department are validated as ready for audit by not later than 
September 30, 2017. Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 also requires the Secretary to establish interim objectives, including objectives for the audit 
readiness of each of the military departments and a schedule of milestones for elements of the 
military departments and financial statements of the military departments to be made ready for 
audit. 
 
Recommendations Related to Financial Management and Audit Readiness 
 
Recommendation 4.1:  The Panel encourages the Secretary of Defense to make compliance 
with financial management and audit readiness standards a top priority.  The Panel also 
recommends that each Chief Management Officer develop and implement a specific plan to 
become compliant with the law well in advance of 2017.61   
  
The Panel finds that it is no longer excusable to allow poor business systems, a deficiency 
of resource allocation, or a lack of commitment from senior leadership to foster waste or non-
accountability to the United States taxpayer.  Despite the magnitude of the challenge, the 
Department should be able to make significant progress in the near term.  Failure to do so is 
fundamentally incompatible with the spirit of acquisition reform. 
 
Recommendation 4.2:  The Panel believes that if the Department fails to make considerable 
improvements in its financial management and audit readiness, appropriate penalties or 
withholds should be considered by the congressional defense committees.62   
 
The Panel recognizes that implementation of these plans will be daunting.  However, 
following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-204), publicly traded 
corporations in the United States were also forced to make difficult changes, or face severe 
penalties for similar deficiencies in financial management and accountability. 
                                                            
61 Recommendation 4.1 was influenced by Ranking Member Conaway’s input on the need for an aggressive 
approach to financial management reform. 
62 Recommendation 4.2 was influenced by Ranking Member Conaway’s input on the need for accountability within 
the Department for financial management reform. 
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PART V:  GETTING THE MOST FROM THE INDUSTRIAL BASE 
 
 The Panel notes that the management of the industrial base has been a challenge for the 
Department dating back to the creation of the Armed Forces.  Discussions of the industrial base 
often focus on retaining unique and perishable defense industrial capabilities.  This is indeed, an 
important strategic priority for the Department.  However, the Panel believes that priority also 
must be placed on giving the Department access to as much of the country’s total industrial base 
as possible.  The Panel notes that many innovative technologies are being developed at smaller 
firms, and that even among larger firms, companies that are primarily commercial in nature have 
been the technology leaders in recent years more so than those in the traditional defense 
industrial base. 
 
Recommendations Related to Industrial Base 
 
Recommendation 5.1: The Department should work with the Department of Commerce, 
Small Business Administration, General Services Administration, and the private sector to 
proactively notify relevant firms, especially small businesses, of contract solicitations rather 
than only relying on firms to find those notifications on FedBizOpps.63   
 
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and the FAR require federal agencies, with 
certain exceptions, to publicly provide notice of solicitations for contracts.  However, the simple 
posting of a solicitation notice on a website does not represent a concerted effort to push 
information about potential contracts to relevant firms.  The Panel believes the Department 
would benefit by utilizing resources from the Department of Commerce, Small Business 
Administration, General Service Administration, and the private sector to directly notify firms in 
relevant industrial classifications of upcoming contract awards.  A small investment in additional 
outreach to industry could demonstrate a large return in increased competition, lower prices, and 
innovation. 
 
Recommendation 5.2:  The Department should enhance its annual analysis of commercial 
price trends so that it can be used as a tool to identify and eliminate improper pricing.  The 
Department should develop tools to collect and make available to contracting officers 
throughout the Department information on prices paid by DOD buying activities for such 
items.64   
 
The Panel believes that the Department could utilize newly emerging data tools to 
compile better information on typical pricing of commercial items as well as prices paid by DOD 
                                                            
63 Recommendation 5.1 was influenced  by Chairman Andrews input on the need for the Department to do a better 
job reaching out and identifying potential contractors, particularly among small businesses 
64 Recommendation 5.2 was influenced by Chairman Andrews input on the need to ensure that the Department is 
able to identify and avoid unwarranted price fluctuations on commercial items. 
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buying activities for common items to determine where the Department is overpaying for such 
items.  The Panel notes that section 803 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261) requires the Department to perform an analysis 
of and report on commercial price trends.65  However, the Department’s reports have only 
focused on whether the entirety of the Department’s commercial purchases are within an 
approximate range with commercial prices for similar purchases.  The intent of the report 
required by section 803 was to generate data that could help identify items and categories of 
commercial purchases where the Department was not obtaining fair pricing.  The Panel believes 
the Department should revisit this analysis using the more sophisticated data analysis tools 
available today as a means of identifying areas of improper pricing and poor performance. 
 
Recommendation 5.3:   Congress should repeal the 3% contract payment withholding 
requirement.66   
 
The Panel notes that Congress created a new obstacle to federal agencies accessing the 
commercial marketplace when it established a requirement that agencies withhold 3% of all 
contract payments in anticipation of taxes owed to the Treasury in section 511 of the Tax 
Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-222).  This requirement is 
currently scheduled to take effect in 2012.  Although the Panel is deeply concerned about firms 
that are delinquent on taxes getting defense contracts, it believes that this requirement will 
substantially discourage commercial firms that are tax compliant from bidding on defense 
contracts and that this requirement should not be applied to the Department’s contracts. 
 
Recommendation 5.4:  The Department should identify potential contractors and grantees 
with serious tax delinquencies and include that information in databases relating to past 
performance and contractor integrity.67   
 
The Panel believes that instead of withholding payments from all firms regardless of their 
tax status, the Department should identify and target firms that have actually been adjudicated as 
seriously delinquent on their taxes.  The Panel notes that the FAR was revised in 2008 to require 
contractors to submit a certification of non-delinquency when submitting bids on federal 
contracts.  The President on January 20, 2010 directed the Internal Revenue Services to review 
the accuracy of these certifications.  Failure to submit such certification or the submission of a 
false certification should be noted in both the Past Performance Information Retrieval System 
(PPIRS) and the contractor integrity database created pursuant to section 872 of the Duncan 
                                                            
65 The initial requirement expired in 2001 but has been extended multiple times by Congress 
66 Recommendation 5.3 was influenced by the testimony of Mr. Richard Sylvester received at the Panel’s hearing on 
September 17, 2009 entitled “The Department of Defense and Industry: Does DOD Effectively Manage its 
Industrial Base and Match its Acquisition Strategies to the Marketplace?”   
67 Recommendation 5.4 was influenced by the input of Representative Ellsworth on the need for the Department to 
do business with reputable contractors. 
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Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.  Contracting officers are 
already required to review these databases before making the determination that a firm is a 
responsible bidder.  The Panel also notes favorably that legislation has been introduced in 
Congress, H.R. 572, which would codify the FAR requirement to submit a certification of non-
delinquency, require firms to authorize the disclosure of seriously delinquent tax debts by the 
Treasury, and would include recipients of grants in these restrictions.  The Panel believes that 
firms which have resolved their tax delinquencies should be provided the ability to enter that 
information into PPIRS and the contractor integrity database on an expedited basis. 
 
Recommendation 5.5:  The Department should review the conclusions of GAO’s ongoing 
study of the costs of contracting with firms with questionable employment practices when it 
is completed and take appropriate action on any GAO recommendations.68   
 
The Panel received testimony indicating that certain federal contractors have histories of 
employment law violations and of low pay and poor benefits.  The testimony indicated that these 
contractors may gain an unfair competitive advantage over responsible contractors and 
ultimately cost more to the government through their employees’ usage of government benefit 
programs.  GAO has undertaken a review of these issues.  The Panel believes that the 
Department should carefully examine GAO’s recommendations, if any, as a result of this review 
and determine whether the Department should take actions to limit such practices. 
 
Recommendation 5.6:  The Department should review the GAO report of October 23, 2009 
on fraud and abuse in the SDVOB program and take steps to eliminate such fraud and 
abuse in defense contracting. 69   
 
GAO released a report on October 23, 2009 entitled, “Service Disabled Veteran-Owned 
Small Business Program: Case Studies Show Fraud and Abuse Allowed Ineligible Firms to 
Obtain Millions of Dollars in Contracts” which identified $100 million of contracts preferentially 
awarded to firms under the set-aside program for Service Disabled Veteran-Owned Small 
Business (SDVOB) program even though the firms did not actually qualify to participate in the 




68 Recommendation 5.5 was influenced by the testimony of Dr. David Madland, received at the Panel’s hearing on 
September 17, 2009 entitled “The Department of Defense and Industry: Does DOD Effectively Manage its 
Industrial Base and Match its Acquisition Strategies to the Marketplace?”  Representative Patrick Murphy attended 
the hearing and requested testimony on this topic. 
69 Recommendation 5.6 was influenced by Representative Ellsworth, who brought the GAO report to the Panel’s 
attention. 
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Recommendation 5.7:  The Department should consider shifting the responsibility for 
reviewing contractor business systems to independent teams within or outside of DCAA 
and DCAA should allocate its audit resources on the basis of risk.70   
 
The Panel received compelling testimony from GAO and from the Defense Contract 
Audit Agency (DCAA) about the methodological difficulties experienced at multiple DCAA 
field offices and on multiple DCAA audits.  These difficulties have undermined the 
independence of DCAA audits and led to audit conclusions that are unsupported by evidence.  
DCAA has initiated a number of steps to strengthen its workforce, reestablish audit 
independence, and reinvigorate its audit culture.  The Panel supports these measures and 
supports GAO’s recommendation that DCAA allocate its audit resources on the basis of risk. 
 
The Panel notes that DCAA’s role in reviewing contractor business systems may be 
difficult to reconcile with its role in auditing the vouchers produced using those systems.  The 
Department should consider creating functional separation within DCAA between those who 
review contractor business systems and those who review vouchers, or consider shifting one of 
these functions to a different agency. 
 
Recommendation 5.8: The Department should consider the totality of the factors required 
to be considered under section 2306b(a) of title 10 United States Code when deciding 
whether to request multiyear procurement authority.71   
 
The Panel notes that multiyear procurement contracts are a potentially useful tool in 
defense acquisition that allow the Department to invest in production improvements over several 
years to reduce production costs.  Multiyear procurement contracts provide funding stability for 
the program, but require the Department to commit to substantial termination liability, reducing 
the Department’s flexibility and incurring risk for waste if the Department’s procurement plans 
change significantly during the course of the multiyear leading the Department to terminate the 
contract.  Multiyear procurement authority is best used on items with mature designs where the 
desired production quantities are well established and the potential savings to the Department are 
considered “substantial.” 
 
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), Congress 
debated the criteria for approving multiyear procurements.  The Senate proposed changing the 
statute that governs multiyear procurement, section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, to 
define “substantial savings” as meaning savings of more than 10%.  The Congress ultimately 
decided to not to define the meaning of “substantial savings” in statute, but included report 
                                                            
70 Recommendation 5.7 was influenced by the testimony of Mr. Gregory Kutz at the Panel’s hearing on October 15, 
2009 entitled “Can the Department of Defense Protect Taxpayers When It Pays Its Contractors?” 
71 Recommendation 5.8 was influenced by the input of Representative Coffman on the need to enhance program 
stability and provide predictability to the Department’s contractors. 
language stating that the term “means savings that exceed 10% of the total costs of carrying out 
the program through annual contracts, except that multiyear contracts for major systems 
providing savings estimated at less than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department 
presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other requirements of section 
2306b(a).”  The Panel notes, however, that in response to a question about a potential multiyear 
for the F/A 18 during his posture hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on 
February 3, 2010, the Secretary of Defense testified that the Department declined to request 
multiyear procurement authority for the F/A 18 because the projected savings was 6.5%, well 
short of 10%.  The Panel is concerned that the Department may be rigidly applying the very 
standard that Congress explicitly declined to impose.  The Panel believes that the decision to 
request multiyear procurement authority should be based on the totality of the factors required to 
be considered under section 2306b(a) of title 10, United States Code, not solely on the basis of 
whether the projected savings are more than 10%. 
 
Recommendation 5.9:  The Department should work internally and through the 
interagency process, to ensure that the export control system effectively protects militarily 
critical technologies (including dual use technologies) while still allowing the industrial base 
to compete in an increasingly global technology marketplace.   
                The Panel notes that the export control system is a primary means by which the United 
States protects militarily critical technologies from being obtained by states and non-state actors 
that pose a national security threat.    The export control system applies to a significantly wider 
scope of information and technologies than those that are protected as classified information.  
For this reason, export controls profoundly affect the industrial base, both as a way of protecting 
U.S. technology, and through the licensing and review process which occurs in relation to a 
substantial percentage of technology exports.  In an increasingly global technology marketplace, 
the performance of the export control system increasingly shapes U.S. participation in 
international trade.  The current export control system, however, can sometimes serve as an 
impediment to the protection of critical technologies.  The Government Accountability Office 
has identified substantial shortcomings in the operation of the export control system including: 
poor interagency coordination in license reviews; jurisdictional disputes that aren’t resolved 
weakening the effectiveness of controls; duplicative licensing processes; and tardiness in 
completing license reviews.  In addition, the rapid pace of technology advancement is not well 
addressed in the current export control system as technology that is highly advanced this year 
can become globally commonplace in a few years time.  The Department should review its 
processes to ensure that the militarily critical technologies list is protecting the right technologies 
and is kept up to date.  The Department should also actively participate in the export control 
system, and in the ongoing interagency review of that system, to ensure that it satisfies the needs 
and priorities of the Department. 
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The panel will examine the defense acquisition system to evaluate its effectiveness in meeting 
two critical, and sometimes conflicting, goals:  1) Providing the best available services, supplies, 
equipment and technology to the warfighter when they are needed and 2) Providing best value to 
the taxpayer for every dollar expended. 
In examining the defense acquisition system, the panel will focus on 5 primary issues: 
1. How does one reasonably measure the ability of the defense acquisition system to meet 
the panel’s two critical goals? 
2. Is the current defense acquisition system effectively meeting these goals, and if not, what 
are the root causes of the system’s failure? 
a. How do the requirements process and the budget process influence acquisition 
outcomes? 
b. Does the defense acquisition system schedule major decision points and bring 
issues for review at the right times – when the appropriate information is available 
to inform decision making? 
c. Are the right people at the right level making decisions and provided with the 
authority to carry them out? 
d. Does the system generate or have access to the right knowledge and information 
to enable good decisions? 
e. Do the people who implement the system (i.e. the acquisition workforce) exist in 
the correct numbers and have the right training to execute decisions and run 
programs efficiently? 
3.  What administrative or cultural pressures, challenges, or negative incentives lead to 
inefficiencies in the system producing bad outcomes? 
4. What proposals have been made to reform the defense acquisition system in studies 
performed by others? 
5. What changes are required to ensure that the defense acquisition system is best designed 
and operated to satisfy the panel’s two critical goals?  
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